Introduction
Countries are often hit by economic shocks of various kinds. One of the most important issues is how this risk can be shared. Originally the IMF was set up to facilitate this kind of risk sharing. Often, the IMF requires countries to make reforms in exchange for providing loans. Sometimes these reforms are very helpful as in the case of India in the early 1990's. In others they can be very damaging as in the case of South Korea in 1997.
The governance of an international organization such as the IMF is crucial to its success. Under the Bretton Woods Agreement and the implicit agreements that go along with it, the Europeans and U.S. dominate. The Asians have relatively little representation. This caused a significant problem during the Asian Crisis of 1997. Despite being one of the most successful economies in the second half of the twentieth century, the South Koreans were forced to raise interest rates and cut government spending. This caused great economic distress. Because of the under-representation of Asian countries in the IMF's governance structure and staff, there was very little that South Korea could do to appeal against the imposition of these harsh measures. Not surprisingly, the conclusion that they and other Asian countries drew from this experience was that they must never again be put in the situation of having to go to the IMF for help. Instead they and many other Asian countries decided to accumulate trillions of dollars of foreign exchange reserves. These are the "global imbalances" that have played such an important role in causing the current crisis.
The self-insurance that these reserves allow has been quite effective. South Korea provides a good example. Its foreign exchange reserves have allowed it to navigate the current crisis without resort to the IMF. However, it is extremely costly and inefficient in terms of resource allocation. First, the method requires that reserves be accumulated. One way to do this is a lowering of consumption in the accumulating countries and an increase in consumption in the countries whose assets are being acquired. These self insurance balances will be long lasting and so represent a real resource cost. Another possibility is that long term debt is issued to finance short term foreign assets. Here the cost is the difference between the long and short term rates. These costs of reserves are the first inefficiency associated with self insurance. The existence of these reserves vastly increased the amount of credit available, particularly in the U.S. but also in other countries such as Spain and Ireland. This easy availability of credit was a major contributor to the property bubbles that lie at the heart of the crisis that started in 2007. This is the second inefficiency.
Going forward one of the major tasks is to eliminate the incentives for the Asian countries to self insure with such large quantities of reserves. One method is to reform the IMF. A second method is for the Asian countries to set up an equivalent body for Asia. A third is for China to allow the RMB to become a reserve currency along with the dollar and the euro.
The IMF and its Governance
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was conceived in July 1944 when the representatives of the 44 governments met in Bretton Woods, and agreed on a framework for international economic cooperation. The Fund was formally established in December, 1945, when the 29 participating countries signed its Articles of Agreement. The institution was created to give confidence to members that the general resources of the Fund would be made temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards. In other words, the IMF was set up to facilitate risk sharing, when its member countries were hit by economic shocks and needed to obtain assistance. The Articles also specified that the institution would provide them with the opportunity to make adjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to based primarily on the size of its quota. Negotiations over IMF quotas have traditionally been informed by formulas that involve GDP at current market prices, international reserves, current payments, current receipts and variability of current receipts. According to Truman (2006) , the increase in a country's individual quota is based on some combination of its current quota share, which always receives the largest weight, an adjustment to bring some countries closer to their calculated quota shares, and occasional ad hoc adjustments for the countries whose quotas are way out of line. Since the existing quota has been given the largest credit in quota calculation, the countries, that were allocated large quotas in original the Bretton Woods Agreement, have maintained high voting shares and have exerted a strong influence on the Fund's decisions. Figure 1 shows a comparison between the current voting share of the country in the IMF and GDP share. East Asian countries such as Japan, China and Korea have lower voting shares than their GDP shares, whereas European countries such as the U.K., Belgium and Sweden maintain higher voting power than their GDP equivalents. Even after several revisions of the voting shares, Asian countries are still underrepresented in the decision making process of the Fund. The Bretton Woods system has affected the current governance of the IMF for over 60 years and this legacy led to a problem in the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.
South Korea in the 1997 Crisis
South Korea has been one of the most successful economies in the world in the second half of the 20 th century and the beginning of the 21 st century. From 1970-2009 the Korean economy grew at an average rate of 7.35% in real terms. With its high economic growth, the country in the 1990s was known as one of the 'Four Asian Tigers', together with Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan.
During the period 1994-1996, Korea showed steady economic growth: the real GDP rate showed 8.2 percent growth on average and the unemployment rate remained about 2 percent. The fiscal position was strong, with a surplus of about 0.4 percent of GDP, and public debt was below 11 percent of GDP, of which only about one-fifth was foreign debt.
However, the seeds of the crisis had been sown over many years. Balino and Ubide (1999) noted that the Korean economy was dominated by large corporations, chaebols, which were highly dependent on borrowing, particularly from the banking system. The high leverage ratios 5 and low profitability of the chaebols made them vulnerable to any shock to their cash flow. In the financial sector, weak regulatory and supervisory arrangement allowed banks to incur excessive risk without building a capital base to withstand shocks. As the chaebols aggressively expanded their business abroad, banks accordingly increased their foreign short-term borrowings and channeled external short-term funds to long term loans financing investments by domestic corporations.
The crisis, which started with the collapse of the Thai Bath peg in July 1997, and subsequent crash of the Hong Kong stock market in Oct 1997, was transmitted to the Korean economy. As the sovereign credit rating of the country was downgraded and the international financial markets contracted credit to Asia, banks were unable to meet their short-term debts.
In response to the banks' request for foreign exchange liquidity, the Bank of Korea disbursed $20 billion of reserves immediately and almost used up its reserves by the end of 1997.
However, the savings of the country in foreign currency was not enough to calm down the financial markets. In order to prevent the bankruptcy of the country, Korea had only one choice left: turn to the last resort of lending, the IMF. On Dec 4 1997, the nation signed the 5 Baliño and Ubide (1999) indicated that the debt ratio of the chaebols exceeded 400 percent during the 1990s, compared to an average of 150 percent in the U.S., 210 percent in Japan and 90 percent in Taiwan. contract with the IMF, pledging to follow the Fund's conditions, and established a $21 billion arrangement.
Taiwan, another Tiger in Asia, is an interesting comparison. In contrast to its neighbors with similar size economies who were financially devastated by the crisis, Taiwan was not badly hit by the storm in the region. The real GDP growth rate and unemployment rate in Taiwan were not greatly affected. The real GDP growth rate of Taiwan slightly decreased from 6.6% in 1997 to 4.5% in 1998, while the rate of Korea significantly dropped from 4.6% to -6.8%. The unemployment rate in Taiwan remained constant averaging 2.7% in 1997-98 period but that of Korea jumped from 2.6% to 7% in the same period. In comparison to Korea, it is true that the structure of the economy in Taiwan was different. The economy of Taiwan was more dependent upon China and consisted of small to medium sized business, which can partly offset the external shock. In terms of the government balance, Taiwan recorded negative numbers from 1994 to 1996, whereas Korea saw positive numbers in the same account 6 . However, there was a major difference between the two countries-holding of reserves. Taiwan held three times more reserves than Korea during 1994 Korea during -1996 . Given that the GDP of Taiwan was half that of Korea in 1997, the reserve to GDP ratio in Taiwan is higher than that of Korea. The reserves to GDP ratio of Korea was 5.9% in 1996 and 3.7% in 1997 while the same ratio of Taiwan was 30.7% in 1996 and 28% in 1997 (Figure 2 ). Regarding this difference, the large reserves in Taiwan at that time buffered it against the outside shock in the late 1990s as it did for Korea in the current crisis. Since the Asian Crisis, Taiwan has been accumulating even more reserves. At the end of 2008, the reserves in Taiwan reached almost three quarters (74.5%) of its GDP.
6 The government balance (percent of GDP) of Taiwan was -3.56%, -4. 32%, -4.97% in year 1994, 1995 and 1996 , while that of Korea was 0.07%, 0.30%, 0.24% during the same period (IMF).
The Wrong Medicine
In exchange for the cash infusion, the IMF prescribed two policies for Korea: high interest rates and tight fiscal policy 7 . Following the disbursement contract, the IMF drove Korea to increase interest rates sharply, and implement a tight fiscal policy 8 . For instance, money market rates climbed from 11% in mid 1997 to 25% in early 1998. Due to the highly leveraged finance structure in the corporate sector, the impact was quickly felt. The debt service burden in corporations intensified as the average lending rate rose and subsequently, many firms faced bankruptcy. In January 1998, compared to mid 1997, the average daily number of corporate insolvencies more than tripled and the percentage of dishonored bills rapidly escalated 9 . With a decline in asset prices and increase in default risk, the credit market significantly contracted, and more firms found it difficult to obtain loans 10 . In particular, SMEs (small and medium sized enterprises) were hit harder by the credit squeeze: they relied more on bank credit financing and had few choices of alternative financing 11 .
Due to tight government spending throughout Q1 of 1998, the recession was made even more severe and accordingly, the overall economy was significantly disrupted. Real GDP recorded negative growth (-6%) in 1998 and unemployment rate rose from its 2%
7 "Monetary policy to be tightened immediately to restore the market and contain inflationary impact of recent Won depreciation. Money market rate will be maintained at a high level as needed to stabilize markets", "For 1998, fiscal policy will remain tight. Additional fiscal measures of about 1-1/2 percent of GDP will be put in place to achieve balance or small surplus" (Dec. 1997, IMF's press release) 8 On December 22, 1997, the statutory ceiling on interest rate was raised from 25 percent per annum to 40 percent and call rates reached 32 percent on December 26 from 12 percent in early Dec 1997. Other market interest rates also increased sharply during this period. The average bank lending and deposit rates climbed from 12 percent before the crisis to 18 percent and the overdraft lending rate jumped 13 percentage points to 37 percent. 9 Baliño and Ubide (1999) showed that the daily number of insolvency increased from 10 in mid 1997 to 30 in Jan 1998. The percentage of dishonored bills grew to 2.3 percent from 0.2% range before the crisis.
10 From the survey conducted by KIIE (the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics), the share of the firms whose loan applications were rejected by financial institutions rose from 14 percent in the first half of 1997 to 38 percent in the first half of 1998. average level to 9% at the beginning of 1999. After a brief spike in early 1998, inflation was subdued owing to weak domestic demand. Even though many people suffered from bankruptcy and job loss, the government could not offer any additional social safety net because its spending was restricted by the agreement with the IMF.
There has been a long debate about whether the IMF used appropriate measures in the Asian Crisis 12 . Some, who defended the Fund, said that it was necessary to increase the interest rates in order to stabilize the foreign exchange market and prevent capital flight.
However, the high interest rate policy was kept for five months in Korea 13 , which was too long, and it consequently inflicted unnecessary pain on the economy. At that time, the IMF brought the same formula that they used for the debt crisis of Latin America in the 1980s:
high interest rates and tight government spending. Unlike South America, the public debt level was much lower in South Korea (below 11 percent of GDP), which eliminated the necessity to restrict government spending. Given the high corporate leverage ratio in Korea, it was clear that the economy would be devastated if the authority raises interest rates. In the middle of negotiations, however, the Fund did not fully investigate the country nor did it sufficiently take into account the differences between the Korean economy and South is the unbalanced governance in the Fund. Asians are underrepresented in the Fund's decision making process. They had a low voting share and relatively few senior staff. The price they paid for this low presence was very harsh.
Reserves as Self-Insurance
The Asian countries, which went through tough times under the policies imposed by the IMF, learned an important lesson: they would have to accumulate foreign exchange reserves to deal with the future crisis without turning to the IMF 16 . Given these countries' experience, neighboring countries, such as China, learnt the same lesson. As seen in Figure 3 18 We used the number in 2007 because it is the highest level of reserves before the current crisis in Korea. The same phenomenon in the rest of East Asia is also explained better with a selfinsurance view. Since the 1997 crisis, the rate of increase in reserves surpassed the same rate of GDP. In Figure 4 , reserves to GDP ratio was below 10 percent before 1997 in Asia but, at the end of 2007, it climbed up to 35%. Some may argue that this increase is mainly due to the reserves accumulation in China. Figure 4 also shows the same number excluding China, which depicts almost the same movement in the period. Regarding the fact that the current account surplus in Asia has been a constant trend since 1990, the sudden increase in reserves since 1997 can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt at self-insurance.
South Korea in the Current Crisis
At the beginning of 2008, South Korea had an ample amount of reserves, $264 billion, amounting to one quarter of its annual GDP. The country was ready to liquidate the assets whenever this was needed. It did not take very long for the country to make use of the savings. In the aftermath of Lehman Brothers' collapse, foreign investors, who held 40 percent 22 of stocks, pulled back their money and consequently, the exchange rate and the stock market were both disrupted 23 . From the memories of 1997, people feared that the nightmare would recur. However, Korea had enough money in hand to extinguish the fire this time.
In comparison with the crisis in 1997, the cause of the current crisis was different. In both cases, the external debt including short-term borrowings rapidly increased before the crises. The government used reserves mainly in two ways: firstly to intervene directly in the foreign exchange market and to supply dollars to banks 25 . In addition, the holding of reserves helped 
Inefficiencies Caused by Large Holdings of Reserves
On an individual country level basis, the acquisition of reserves has been a significant success. However, it is costly and inefficient in terms of resource allocation. There are at least two inefficiencies associated with holding large reserves. First, the method requires a lowering of consumption in the accumulating countries and an increase in consumption in the countries whose assets are being acquired. The self-insurance reserves will be long lasting and so represent a real one-time resource flow. The countries acquiring the reserves are poor relative to the U.S., which is the main consuming country. Secondly, the existence of these reserves vastly increased the amount of credit available, particularly in U.S. but also in other countries. This credit led to property bubbles as we have argued above.
The cost of reserves has been debated over the years particularly after the Asian crisis.
Regarding the opportunity cost and the contraction of the domestic consumption, accompanied with national savings, some argue that reserves are expensive assets to hold.
Others disagree with this view because they take other effects into account, such as the potential cost of the financial crisis that may be avoided and the spread for external borrowing which is lowered by reserves. Rodrik (2006) calculates that the social costs of reserves amount to 1 percent of GDP for developing nations as a whole. Regarding central banks holding their reserves mostly in the form of low-yielding short-term U.S. Treasury securities, Rodrik reports each dollar of reserves that country invests in these assets comes at an opportunity cost that equals the cost 29 The government received back its dollar supply which it lent to banks in 2008 and the current account surplus also contributed to rapid increase in dollar infusion.
of external borrowing for that economy. Summers (2006) sees countries with excessive reserves earn almost zero return measured in domestic terms, whereas they can benefit from a return of 6 percent if they invest either domestically in infrastructure or in fully diversified long-term global assets. Summers calculated the opportunity cost of these reserves comes to 1.85 percent of their combined GDP, aggregating the ten leading holders of large reserves.
In Korea, the direct cost of reserves 30 32 It is called Greenspan-Guidotti rule.
33 Choi, former Director of International Finance in Ministry of Finance, thinks the government needs to include foreigners' ownership of stocks with a market capitalization basis when it determines the optimal level of reserves. Summing up one third of foreign possession in the stock market, three months imports and short-Notwithstanding the inefficiency of the resource utilization, the speed of accumulating reserves is likely to be continued or even accelerated within the next few years.
Secondly, political constraints on buying large amounts of equity mean that most of these investments were in the form of debt securities. This easy availability of credit was a major contributor to the property bubbles that lie at the heart of the crisis that started in 2007.
It is the second inefficiency associated with large reserves.
Why the excessive credit flowed to the U.S. and Europe has been the topic of intense discussion. The 'Saving Glut view', explaining the phenomenon with a supply side push from the developing world, is advanced by Bernanke (2005) . The Asian countries increased reserves through the expedient of issuing debt to their citizens, thereby mobilizing domestic saving, and then using the proceeds to buy U.S. Treasury securities and other assets. This shift by developing nations, together with the high saving propensities of Germany and Japan, has resulted in a 'Saving Glut', which boosted equity value and helped to increase home values in the U.S. Summers (2006) also notes that three elements; a capital flow from emerging markets to industrial countries, huge accumulation of reserves and expected negative returns on reserves, constituted the capital flows paradox. As a consequence of this paradox, he explains that the current account deficit is growing in U.S. and investment in the U.S. is tilted towards real estate and the non-traded goods sector.
In response to this view, Shin (2009) suggests that the holdings of U.S. debt securities is explained by the momentum of rapidly growing balance sheets in the residential mortgage sector which searches for funding sources. The greater risk-taking capacity of the shadow banking system leads to an increased demand for new assets to fill the expanding term debt, Choi suggests 300 billion dollars for a benchmark. balance sheets and an increase in leverage. Among the new sources of funding will be foreign investors, including the central banks in Asia. One problem with this view is that reserves are back to where they were before the crisis despite the fact that U.S. banks have deleveraged.
There is not much demand from them any more but reserves are already back where they were and are continuing to grow.
The abundant reserves in East Asia, which are spurred by the IMF's unbalanced governance and inappropriate economic policy, flowed to the U.S. where there is great demand for credit. Due to political constraints, much of these reserves were invested in the form of debt securities. Attempts to buy equities by Asian countries were often not allowed.
In August percent stake at Rio Tinto, the world's third-largest mining company in Australia, after it confronted opposition, reflecting fears of giving China direct access to natural resources.
Moreover, the countries which hold reserves for a precautionary demand need to keep reserves in the form of secure assets which can be easily liquidated. For this reason, most reserves held by Asian countries are invested in debt securities. As Figure 7 demonstrates, more than half of reserves in Korea were invested in government bills or GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprise) backed securities. Only 3.5 percent of total reserves were invested in equity.
This capital inflow into U.S. debt securities helped to drive down lending standards and led to an excessive supply of credit especially to the housing sector. As seen in Figure 8 , it is unlikely to be a coincidence that housing prices in the U.S. started to increase sharply after the Asian Financial Crisis. It can be argued that the root cause of what happened can be traced back to the IMF. We will discuss how we solve this problem in the next section.
Fixing the Problem
Going forward, we suggest three possible solutions to eliminate the incentives for the Asian countries to self insure with large quantities of reserves. These are reforming the IMF, expanding regional or bilateral insurance, and allowing an additional reserve currency.
Amidst the mounting criticism toward the IMF and in particular its policies on developing countries, members and outside observers have voiced the need to reform the organization. There was an evaluation that the IMF's guidelines for the troubled Asian nations did not embrace differences in the Asian countries. Emerging economies also do not trust the IMF because they do not think they have enough say in it. The insurance function of the Fund has been diminishing since developing countries were dissatisfied with the Fund's policies (Kupur and Webb, 2007) .
In order to reform the organization, the governance of the IMF needs to be changed.
Together, European countries still have more than 30 percent of the votes and the U.S. has nearly 17 percent. Truman (2006) can use its currency to trade goods, it will be less dependent on the dollar and can slow or cut back its savings in the dollar, which possibly will relieve the global imbalance problem. To achieve its goal, China needs to minimize its capital controls and free its foreign exchange market.
Concluding Remarks
Many people have argued that global imbalances played an important role in causing the financial crisis. The combination of low interest rates set by the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks and the easy availability of credit resulting from global imbalances caused a housing bubble in the U.S. and a number of other countries. The bursting of this bubble caused the start of the crisis. In this paper we have looked at the causes of global imbalances by considering South Korea. We have argued that the lack of Asian influence and representation in the senior ranks of the IMF meant that it pursued bad policies in the 1997 Asian crisis. One of the few countries to avoid having to seek outside help in 1997 was Taiwan thanks to its large foreign exchange reserves. The lesson many Asian countries drew was that being independent of the IMF was highly desirable and the way to do this was to acquire foreign exchange reserves. This led to a significant increase in Asian central bank reserves.
reserve currency the SDR (Special Drawing Rights). Under his plan, the amount of SDRs would be increased and the basket expanded to include other currencies, notably the RMB.
The strategy of building up reserves has turned out to be a success. Korea came through the crisis better than most countries. With the exception of Japan, the rest of East Asia has also done quite well. In the case of Japan, the combination of a strong currency and a trade orientation in many industries, led to a bad outcome. The lesson that most East Asian countries seem to have drawn from the current crisis is that more reserves are desirable. The problem of global imbalances is therefore likely to persist at least in the short term.
As mentioned above a third of global foreign exchange reserves are held by China.
Initially, China may also have been driven by a desire not to be beholden to western dominated institutions. It is arguably the most underrepresented country at the IMF, for example. However, over time it can be argued that China has discovered that it is extremely advantageous to have enormous foreign exchange reserves. The U.S. now treats China with much more respect than previously. The U.S. knows that if China were to start shifting its reserves out of the dollar in large quantities, the U.S. economy would be badly damaged. In recent years China has significantly increased it military capability. Its large foreign exchange reserves provide an alternative way of influencing other countries and in particular the U.S.
Although reform of the IMF would be desirable, it seems likely that the extent of reform required to make global imbalances unnecessary will not occur. Regional agreements are also helpful but these are unlikely to be sufficient to persuade countries to do away with their reserves. The most likely development in the medium term is that China's currency, the RMB, will become fully convertible and join the dollar and the euro as the third global reserve currency. This will eliminate the need for China to hold foreign exchange reserves and will go a long way toward solving the global imbalances problem.
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